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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
Administrative Appeal Decision Notice 
Inmate Name: PHIFER, RENITA 
NYSIDNo 
Dept. DIN#: 9600030 
Appearances: 
For the Board, the Appeals Unit 
For Appellant: 
Renita Phifer (9600030) 
Taconic Correctional Facility 
250 Harris Road 
Facility: Taconic Correctional Facility 
Appeal Control#: 06-133-18 B 
Bedford Hills, New York 10507 
Board Member(s) who participated in appealed from de~ision: Coppola, Demosthenes, Shapiro. 
Decision appealed from: 6/2018 Denial of Discretionary Release; 24-month hold. 
Pleadings considered: 
Brief on behalf of the Appellant submitted on: October 23, 2018. 
Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation. 
Documents relied upon: 
Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release 
Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan. 
==.=..;:~~in=a=t;:;.;io=n: The undersigned have determined that the decision from which this appeal was taken 
be and the same is hereby 
L Affirmed Reversed for De Novo Interview Modified to -----
Reversed for De Novo Interview Modified to ____ _ 
Reversed for De Novo Interview Modified to _-"----
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ~te findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on I~/ '18//-g 
LJ3 
Distribution: Appeals Unit- Inmate - Inmate's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (5/2011) 
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Appellant raises various issues in the brief submitted in support of the administrative appeal 
initiated following the Board of Parole’s decision to deny her immediate release to community 
supervision following an interview held on or about June 5, 2018.  The Appeals Unit has reviewed 
each of the issues raised by Appellant and finds that the issues have no merit. 
 
The issues raised by Appellant are as follows: (1) the Board’s decision was not made in 
accordance with applicable legal authority; (2) the Board did not sufficiently consider Appellant’s 
institutional accomplishments, remorse and rehabilitative efforts; (3) certain issues were not 
discussed during the interview; (4) the Board’s decision was made in violation of Appellant’s due 
process rights; (5) the Board failed to consider Appellant’s sentencing minutes at the time of the 
interview; and (6) the Board did not provide sufficient weight to certain “low” scores contained in 
her COMPAS instrument. 
 
            As to issues one and two, the legal standard governing the decision-making process of the 
Board when assessing the suitability of an inmate’s possible release to community supervision is: 
(1) whether or not there is a reasonable probability that the inmate, if released, will live and remain 
at liberty without violating the law; (2) whether or not the inmate’s release is incompatible with 
the welfare of society; and (3) whether or not the inmate’s release will so deprecate the seriousness 
of the crime as to undermine respect for law. See Executive Law §§259-c(4), 259-i(2)(c)(A); 
Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244 (W.D.N.Y. 2010); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268 (3d Dept. 2014).  In the instant case, the Board considered each 
of these three factors and specifically relied upon factors (2) and (3) in making its determination 
to deny Appellant’s release to community supervision and further found that it was not convinced 
that Appellant would live and remain at liberty without violating the law. 
 
          “Clearly, the Board of Parole has been vested with an extraordinary degree of responsibility 
in determining who will go free and who will remain in prison, and a [inmate] who seeks to obtain 
judicial review on the grounds that the Board did not properly consider all of the relevant factors, 
or that an improper factor was considered, bears a heavy burden.” Garcia v. New York State Div. 
of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239 (1st Dep't 1997) (emphasis added). See also Matter of Phillips v. 
Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17 (1st Dept. 2007). 
 
Unless Appellant is able to demonstrate convincing evidence to the contrary, the Board is 
presumed to have acted properly in accordance with statutory requirements, and judicial 
intervention is warranted only when there is a showing of irrationality to the extent that it borders 
on impropriety. Matter of Jackson v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 701 (2d Dept. 2014); Matter of Williams v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.3d 992 (3rd Dept. 2014); Matter of Thomches v. Evans,  
108 A.D.3d 724 (2d Dept. 2013).   
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In determining whether to grant parole to an inmate, the Board is required to consider a 
number of statutory factors (see Executive Law §§259-c(4); 259-i(2)(c)(A); 9 NYCRR §8002.2).  
In addition, the Board’s decision must detail the reasons for a denial of discretionary release (see 
Executive Law §259–i(2)(a)(i)).  However, the Board is not required to give each factor it 
considered equal weight (Matter of Arena v. New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community 
Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hill v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
130 A.D.3d 1130 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Vigliotti v. State of N.Y. Exec. Div. of Parole, 98 A.D.3d 
789 (3d Dept. 2012); Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948 (2d Dept. 
2012); Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690 (2d Dept. 2010)), and its 
actual or perceived emphasis on a specific factor is not improper as long as the Board complied with 
statutory requirements. Romer v. Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Collado v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 287 A.D.2d 921 (3d Dept. 2001); Matter of Rivera v. Executive 
Department, Board of Parole, 268 A.D.2d 928 (3d Dept. 2000).   
 
The Board is entitled to afford more weight to the nature and seriousness of the underlying 
crime(s) and the inmate’s criminal history than other factors. See Matter of Perez v. Evans, 76 
A.D.3d 1130 (3d Dept. 2010).  In this regard, the denial of release to community supervision 
primarily because of the gravity of the inmate’s crime is appropriate. Karlin v. Alexander, 57 A.D.3d 
1156 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Alamo v. New York State Div. of Parole, 52 A.D.3d 1163 (3d 
Dept. 2008); Matter of Flood v. Travis, 17 A.D.3d 757 (3d Dept. 2005).   
 
             The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the First Department decision in Matter of Siao-
Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105 (1st Dept. 2008), aff'd, 11 N.Y.3d 777 (2008), in which the Appellate 
Court held: (1) it is not improper for the Board to primarily base its decision to deny parole release 
on the seriousness of the offense(s); (2) the weight to be assigned to each factor considered by the 
Board in making its determination is to be made solely by the Board; (3) parole release should not 
granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined; 
and (4) the Board can consider the credibility of statements made by the inmate in regard to 
whether full responsibility was taken for the criminal behavior.  
 
So long as the decision denying release to community supervision is made in accordance 
with statutory requirements, it is not to be set aside when subject to administrative or judicial review, 
particularly given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary parole denial 
determinations. Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268 (3d 
Dept. 2014); Matter of Williams v. New York State Division of Parole, 114 A.D.3d 992 (3d Dept. 
2014); Matter of Martinez v. Evans, 108 A.D.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Burress v. Evans, 
107 A.D.3d 1216 (3d Dept. 2013). 
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            An inmate is not automatically entitled to release to community supervision merely because 
of achievements within a prison’s institutional setting, no matter how numerous. Pearl v. New York 
State Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058 (3d Dept. 2006); Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 33 
A.D.3d 1142 (3d Dept. 2006); Rivera v. Travis, 289 A.D.2d 829 (3d Dept. 2001).  In addition, per 
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), an application for release to community supervision shall not be 
granted merely as a reward for Appellant’s good conduct or achievements while incarcerated. Matter 
of Larrier v. New York State Board of Parole Appeals Unit, 283 A.D.2d 700 (3d Dept. 2001).  
Therefore, a determination that the inmate’s exemplary achievements are outweighed by the 
severity of the crimes is within the Board’s discretion. Matter of Anthony v. New York State 
Division of Parole, 17 A.D.3d 301 (1st Dept. 2005); Matter of Kirkpatrick v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 385 
(2d Dept. 2004). 
 
           Appellant has the burden of showing that the Board's determination was irrational, bordering 
on impropriety, and therefore arbitrary and capricious, before administrative or judicial intervention 
is warranted. Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470 (2000); Singh v. Dennison, 107 A.D. 3d 
1274 (3d Dept. 2013).  It is not the function of the Appeals Unit to assess whether the Board gave 
proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether the Board followed applicable legal 
authority when rendering its decision, and that is supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in 
the record. Matter of Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 A.D.3d 1295 (3d Dept. 
2009); see Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268.  The 
weight to be accorded each of the requisite factors remains solely a matter of the Parole Board’s 
discretion.  See Matter of Dolan v. New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058 (3d Dept. 
2014); Matter of Singh v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 1209 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Khatib v. New York 
State Board of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 
197 (3d Dept.), leave to appeal granted, 23 N.Y.3d 903, appeal dismissed, 24 N.Y.3d 1052 (2014).  
Appellant has not demonstrated any abuse on the part of the Board in its decision-making process that 
would warrant a de novo release interview. 
 
            As to the third issue, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with the Board 
during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that certain issues 
were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter of Serna v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684 (3d Dept. 2001); Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235 (1st Dept. 1997).   
 
 As to the fourth issue, Appellant claims that a constitutionally protected due process right was 
violated by the Board in making its determination.  Initially, we note that the Supreme Court has held 
that because a person's liberty interest is extinguished upon conviction, there is no inherent right, 
or right under the U.S. Constitution, to parole.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and  
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Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).  Likewise, there 
is no due process right to parole under the New York State Constitution. Boothe v. Hammock, 605 
F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1979); Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 69; Matter of Freeman v. New York State 
Division of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174 (3d Dept. 2005). Thus, the protections of the due process 
clause do not apply to the Parole Board’s determinations as to whether an inmate should be released 
to parole supervision. Maldonado v. Evans, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183163 (W.D.N.Y. 2014); 
Barrow v. Vanburen, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181466 (N.D.N.Y. 2014); Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 
169 (2d Cir. 2001).  We recognize, however, that while an inmate has no vested right to parole 
release under the due process clause, there is a liberty interest which requires, as a matter of 
procedural due process, an opportunity to be heard, and a statement of the reasons for the denial 
of release.  Therefore, in deciding whether to grant or deny parole, all the Board must do is: (1) 
afford the inmate an opportunity to be heard, and (2) if parole is denied, provide the reasons for 
the denial. Thurman v. Allard, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18904 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Blackett v. 
Thomas, 293 F.Supp.2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Gittens v. Thomas, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9087 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).  Appellant received both of these constitutional protections and, therefore, any 
arguments alleging that the Board’s decision was made in violation of the due process clause, and 
in contravention of a liberty interest arising from the due process clause, are without merit. 
 
     As to the fifth issue, with respect to Appellant’s argument that the appealed from decision 
should be set aside because the Parole Board did not have the sentencing minutes from her sentencing 
proceeding at the time it interviewed her to assess the appropriateness of her discretionary release, 
there is no dispute that the Board neither had nor considered the sentencing minutes at the time the 
interview was conducted.  However, where the Board had made good faith efforts to obtain the 
sentencing minutes from the sentencing court, but was unsuccessful, and Appellant failed to 
produce documentation that the sentencing minutes contained a parole recommendation, the 
Board’s failure to consider the sentencing minutes did not prejudice Appellant and amounted to 
harmless error. Matter of Matul v. Chair of the New York State Board of Parole, 69 A.D.3d 1196 
(3d Dept. 2010); Matter of Midgette v. New York State Division of Parole, 70 A.D. 3d 1039, (2d 
Dept. 2010); Glover v. The New York State Division of Parole, Index No. 2009-10824 (Sup. Ct., 
Orange Co., Jan. 19, 2010) (Bartlett, J.); Jose Andreo v. George Alexander, Index No. 185-09 
(Sup. Ct., Albany Co., June 23, 2009)(Platkin, J.).   
 
 As to the sixth issue, in determining an inmate’s suitability for possible release to 
community supervision, the Board must consider the institutional record of the inmate. See §259-
i(2)(c)(A)(i); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.2(d)(1).  One of the institutional records the Board must 
consider in making its determination as to the suitability of an inmate’s possible release to 
community supervision is a risk and needs assessment designed to measure the inmate’s 
rehabilitation. See Executive Law §259-c(4). In strict compliance with statutory and regulatory  
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requirements, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision promulgated Directive 
8500 which provides comprehensive operating procedures governing the Correctional Offender 
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions instrument, commonly referred to as the 
COMPAS instrument, a research based clinical assessment instrument used to assist staff in 
assessing an inmate’s risks and needs by gathering quality and consistent information to support 
decisions about supervision, treatment and other interventions. “By adopting the COMPAS risk 
assessment and utilizing it in considering an inmate's release, the Board has effectively complied 
with the minimal requirements of the amendments to the Executive Law.”  Matter of Steven Diaz 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 42 Misc. 3d 532 (Sup. Ct.; Cayuga Co. 2013).   
 
The information contained in the COMPAS instrument is used to assist the Board of Parole 
in making its decision, but the quantified results contained in the COMPAS instrument are not 
alone determinative factors in the decision-making process. See Executive Law §§259-c(4), 259-
i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Leung v. Evans, 120 A.D.3d (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 914 
(2015); Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107 (3d Dept. 2014); accord, 
Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059 (3d Dept. 2014). Moreover, uniformly low 
COMPAS scores and other evidence of an inmate’s rehabilitation do not undermine the broader 
questions of public safety, public perceptions of the seriousness of a crime, and whether an 
inmate’s release to parole would undermine respect for the law.  Thus, the COMPAS instrument 
cannot mandate a particular result, and the Board determines the weight to be ascribed to the 
information contained therein. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396 (3d Dept. 2016).   
 
The COMPAS instrument is used to develop the inmate’s Offender Case Plan (formerly 
called the “Transitional Accountability Plan” or “TAP”), which is created for, and in cooperation 
with, an inmate by an Offender Rehabilitation Coordinator (ORC). The Case Plan serves to 
prioritize the inmate’s needs and establish goals to address these needs, and further provides tasks 
designed to achieve these goals.  Case Plans are reviewed with the inmate quarterly unless the 
inmate is more than four years from the earliest release date in which instance it is reviewed less 
frequently.  A Case Plan was prepared for Appellant and made available to the Board at the time 
of the interview.  
 
  Appellant limits her remarks with respect to the COMPAS instrument to certain “Low” 
scores contained therein.  However, she did score “High” for History of Violence.  Also, there are 
several more pages of narrative and scales contained in the COMPAS instrument that the Board 
also reviewed and considered in making its decision to deny parole release. The Board in deviating 
from the low COMPAS scores looked at all of these factors as well as all of the other records 
before it at the time of the interview, and of course considered what was discussed during the 
interview.   
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Finally, we note that there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to judges 
and administrative fact-finders.  See People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 
A.D.2d 914 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to have followed applicable statutory 
requirements and internal policies when making decisions regarding the suitability of an inmate’s 
possible release to parole supervision. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000).  There is no evidence 
that the Board’s decision was predetermined.  See Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 
A.D.2d 899 (3d Dept. 2000).   
 
Recommendation: 
 
 It is the recommendation of the Appeals Unit that the Board’s decision be affirmed.     
